The ShakeOut Scenario assessed earth-science impacts, physical damage, and socioeconomic impacts of a hypothetical M7.8 southern San Andreas Fault earthquake. Among many detailed studies were special studies of 12 lifelines, 7 of which were performed by panels of employees of the utilities at risk. Panels met for four hours. Panelists were presented with the scenario's earth science impacts and previously estimated damage to "upstream" lifelines. They then hypothesized a realistic outcome of the earthquake on damage and service restoration, identifying research needs and mitigation options. The panel process worked well: panelists were well qualified and seemed to fairly assess realistic earthquake impacts and restoration, probably more realistically than an outside consultant would have been able to do, thus improving the ShakeOut. Panelists gained insight into lifeline interaction, mutual-aid needs, communication capabilities, and backup supplies. Southern California Edison, for example, enhanced its planning and preparedness for a large Southern California earthquake. The process is not thoroughly documented, but it appears CGS authors talked with engineers or operators of the lifelines in question in the process of deriving the scenarios. For example, in the acknowledgments section of Davis et al. (1982) , the authors thank two employees of Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E). In their section on power, they draw on two earlier studies (Algermissen et al. 1972 (Algermissen et al. , 1973 to support their power scenario, which describes shaking damage and restoration of power plants, major substations, and transmission lines. The authors sometimes describe damage to power-system components in specific though non-quantified terms, such as "failure of porcelain insulators," and sometimes in broader, qualitative terms, such as "significant damage" to substations or "slight damage" to a) University of Colorado at Boulder and SPA Risk LLC, Denver, CO 80207, keith@cohen-porter. Other studies rely more heavily on computer models. For example, ATC (1991) offers engineering assessments of utility risk based on estimates of shaking at each facility site, combined with seismic vulnerability functions that relate the shaking to repair cost and functionality. The ATC (1991) authors estimated physical damage and economic impact of a few scenario earthquakes on all the major lifelines. The vulnerability and restoration functions drew on expert judgment to relate MMI to damage and restoration time. Werner et al. (1997) offer a methodology and describe software to simulate seismic damage and trafficflow impacts to a highway network, with particular attention to bridge damage. The system evolved into the REDARS methodology and software (Werner et al. 2006) , which its developers used to provide input to the ShakeOut highway damage panel.
INTRODUCTION
Many earthquake emergency planning scenarios include (among other things) an assessment of the physical damages and service restoration to affected lifelines such as water supply, power, and the roadway network. These lifeline damage assessments have typically been made by a small group of experts unaffiliated with the lifeline in question. For example, various earthquake planning scenarios have been published by the California Division of Mines and Geology (CDMG, now the California Geological Survey, CGS), each created by a small group of CDMG experts and consultants. Six authors wrote Davis et al. (1982) planning scenario for an earthquake similar to the 1906 San Francisco event, six for the Steinbrugge et al. (1987) Hayward Fault planning scenario, and five for the Toppozada et al. (1988) Newport-Inglewood Fault scenario.
The process is not thoroughly documented, but it appears CGS authors talked with engineers or operators of the lifelines in question in the process of deriving the scenarios. For example, in the acknowledgments section of Davis et al. (1982) , the authors thank two employees of Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E). In their section on power, they draw on two earlier studies (Algermissen et al. 1972 (Algermissen et al. , 1973 to support their power scenario, which describes shaking damage and restoration of power plants, major substations, and transmission lines. The authors sometimes describe damage to power-system components in specific though non-quantified terms, such as "failure of porcelain insulators," and sometimes in broader, qualitative terms, such as "significant damage" to substations or "slight damage" to power plants. They describe restoration of these components as taking for example "less than 12 hours," or "possibly beyond 72 hours."
Other studies rely more heavily on computer models. For example, ATC (1991) offers engineering assessments of utility risk based on estimates of shaking at each facility site, combined with seismic vulnerability functions that relate the shaking to repair cost and functionality. The ATC (1991) authors estimated physical damage and economic impact of a few scenario earthquakes on all the major lifelines. The vulnerability and restoration functions drew on expert judgment to relate MMI to damage and restoration time. Werner et al. (1997) offer a methodology and describe software to simulate seismic damage and trafficflow impacts to a highway network, with particular attention to bridge damage. The system evolved into the REDARS methodology and software (Werner et al. 2006) , which its developers used to provide input to the ShakeOut highway damage panel.
In its brief guidelines for developing emergency planning scenarios, EERI (2006) recommends engaging many diverse experts from a wide variety of disciplines in workgroups that develop a scenario, though the details of which experts and how they should be engaged are largely left to the scenario developer.
In creating the recent ShakeOut Scenario, our development team took what appears to be a novel approach to creating the scenario document. The ShakeOut Scenario document lays out the potential impacts of a hypothetical M7.8 earthquake on the southern San Andreas Fault, and as recommended by EERI (2006) , engaged a wide variety of experts. The novelty addressed in the present paper is that some of the lifeline damage and restoration aspects of the scenario were created by panels of engineers, operators, and planners who work for the utilities in question and who met together to learn about the scenario shaking and other effects, and to discuss and reach some consensus about a realistic outcome.
We describe here our motivation, methodology, and some findings of this panel process, and illustrate with a case study of power and the participation of Southern California Edison. We focus on the process of panel discussions, rather than on the panels' particular findings for this particular hypothetical earthquake, because the process itself is interesting and may be of value to others in developing future emergency planning scenarios. Results of panel discussions (and other aspects of the scenario) can be found in Jones et al. (2008) .
MOTIVATION
Among 20 studies of physical impacts that contributed to the ShakeOut Scenario (see Figure 1 ) were 12 of lifelines: water supply, wastewater, power, dams, mass transit, surface streets, highways, the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, telecommunications, rail, oil and gas pipelines, and hospitals. Of these, the first eight were performed by expert panels comprising a total of approximately 100 engineers, operators, and emergency planners employed by the utilities at risk, as well as a few unaffiliated or retired experts. The highway panel used a consultant study (Werner et al. 2008) as input along with other material discussed later. The studies of telecommunications (Tang 2008) , rail (Byers 2008) , oil and gas pipelines (Ballantyne 2008) , and hospitals (Pickett 2008) were performed by specialist consultants without panel review. Two additional physical-damage studies-high-rise steelframe buildings (Krishnan and Muto 2008) and fire following earthquake (Scawthorn 2008 )-relied more heavily on specialist consultants, although panels acted as reviewers because of the sensitive nature of the findings. For the remaining studies, the interested reader is referred to Seligson (2008) for the HAZUS study; Eguchi and Ghosh (2008) for hazardous materials; Schiff (2008) for elevators; Graf (2008) for woodframe buildings; and Hess (2008) for unreinforced masonry.
The original motivation in organizing the panels was threefold. As a practical matter, the project lacked the resources to commission studies of satisfactory depth and credibility for all of these lifelines. Panels could be convened at very low cost compared to commissioning a study. At the same time, panel assessments can provide two notable benefits: First, enhanced credibility, because the assessments are made by those most intimately familiar with the assets at risk, and second, greater community engagement. The goal of the ShakeOut (and the Southern California Multihazards Demonstration Project, of which the ShakeOut was an important product) was ultimately to show how science can help communities to enhance their resiliency to natural disasters. Involving the community in assessing the impacts of the scenario could potentially enhance uptake of the scenario's lessons. As will be shown later, all three objectives appear to have been satisfied. 
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METHODOLOGY LIFELINES OF INTEREST
We first identified the lifelines that most interested us (Figure 1 ). These were the ones that are potentially vulnerable to large fault offsets, or whose failure would have potentially great economic or public-health impact. Some important lifelines were not studied, such as police and fire stations, because it was felt that they had either been extensively retrofitted for seismic resistance (e.g., fire stations) or whose physical damage would not as strongly impact the economy or public health (e.g., police stations).
IDENTIFY LIFELINES AMENABLE TO PANEL DISCUSSION
Some lifeline service providers tend to be open to and used to participating in public discussions of seismic risk, for example state and local agencies responsible for transportation. The California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) sponsors academic and applied research into the seismic vulnerability of highway structures. We organized panel discussions for these more-open lifelines: mass transit, highways, surface streets, dams, water, wastewater, and power. Others have regulatory or other business constraints that require their employees who deal with natural hazards not to disclose or discuss the locations or vulnerabilities of assets. Telecommunications service providers and oil and gas pipeline companies for example tend to be unable to engage in such public discussions, for security reasons. Some lifelines like hospitals are so decentralized that any panel that represented a significant fraction of the assets at risk would be too unwieldy to organize. Others, such as fire departments and rail, lack the necessary expertise to estimate the impacts of the scenario earthquake, though they are capable of providing judgment as to the credibility of a scenario loss estimate. For all of these latter lifelines, we engaged consultants to perform independent studies of lifeline risk. In several cases we organized panels to review the findings of the consultant studies. The present manuscript deals only with the lifeline panels that estimated the earthquake impacts.
SCHEDULE PANELS AND INVITE ATTENDEES
The panel process was greatly facilitated by the fact that Caltech and the USGS have long operated an outreach program called the Earthquake Research Affiliates (ERA). ERA is a membership organization comprising a few dozen Southern California utilities, engineering firms, and city government groups who meet biannually at Caltech for half-day seminars offered by USGS staff and Caltech faculty on scientific or technical advances relevant to the members. Thus ERA had well established relationships with most of the lifeline service providers of interest. The program director knew whom to invite to each panel, who would be interested, best able to contribute, and who would most benefit from the conversation. Through ERA, we sent invitations to leading operators, engineers, emergency managers, and retirees of the relevant lifelines. Invitations were sent out 4 weeks or so in advance, and comprised a 2-page letter with an agenda, a 1-page abstract of the ShakeOut exercise, and driving and parking directions to the panel discussions. Invitations were followed up with email and telephone calls to try to ensure sufficient participation. These logistical details may seem irrelevant to the reader who has not personally convened groups of volunteers for such an activity. We found them important to the success of the panel process, and offer them as practical guidance for the methodology.
ORDER OF PANELS
We organized the panels in a generally upstream-to-downstream order. By this we mean that damage and restoration of some lifelines are affected to a greater degree by impacts to other lifelines. For example, the functionality of the power system does not depend very much on wastewater service, commercial telecommunications, or water supply, but water supply in many districts does require commercial power. In our meaning, power would therefore be an upstream lifeline, while water supply would be a downstream one. We held the panels on supposedly downstream lifelines after the upstream ones, to more easily provide relevant lifeline-interaction information.
PANEL DURATION AND AGENDA
It was necessary to balance thoroughness with convenience for the panelists. A longer discussion allows for more-detailed discussions but tends to reduce attendance. We judged 4 hours to be a reasonable compromise and achieved a substantial turnout. Each panel following the same rough agenda shown in Table 1 .
During the first hour or so, the lifeline damage inputs were presented. Experts who had estimated the scenario's earth science impacts presented panelists with information about the seismicity of the causative fault, its surface offset, shaking, duration, landsliding, etc. To the greatest extent possible we provided panelists with maps and movies of these inputs: the fault rupture, shaking propagation, ultimate shaking intensity, and in a few cases like dams, the known locations of particular assets, overlain on the map of shaking and fault offset.
We also offered comparable maps from previous events they may have experienced, such as the 1994 Northridge earthquake or the 2008 Chino Hills earthquake, which had occurred only weeks before the panels convened. We provided these images in the most universally accessible format we could think of: Google Earth KMZ files and QuickTime movies, which we made accessible for download from a publically accessible website. The Google Earth files depicted rupture offset and shaking intensities estimated by the USGS, CGS, and their colleagues, and measured in several ways: Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI), peak ground acceleration, damped elastic spectral acceleration response at various periods, peak ground velocity, and a design load map extracted from the International Building Code. (The maps are shown elsewhere in this special issue of Earthquake Spectra, so they are not duplicated here).
The QuickTime movies depicted the propagation of shaking from the fault rupture across the affected areas, from various perspectives. We considered and rejected disseminating data files in ArcGIS or other proprietary formats. Despite the potential opportunity that such files might offer to panelists to better understand the shaking impacts on their lifelines, none of the panelists asked for ArcGIS files. We doubt that many-perhaps any-would have or could have used them. Google Earth and QuickTime, by comparison, were free and far easier to use, and with the satellite imagery available in Google Earth, more informative.
The moderator then summarized the findings of any prior panels or completed studies that might interact with the lifeline under discussion, e.g., power, because power is required to pump groundwater. For example, the highway panel was presented with the results of the consultant study (Werner et al. 2008) . During the next 45 minutes or so, in facilitated group discussion, the panel reviewed the nature and distribution of the assets at risk, their past seismic performance, and relevant studies about the lifeline vulnerability.
The rest of the time was spent on the central business of the panel: discussing potential damages and their service impacts. While we discussed particular locations that could be damaged and the consequences of that damage, the ultimate goal was to tabulate a single realistic outcome of the earthquake on the lifeline: a service restoration timeline. That is, we wanted to know what fraction of lifeline users in the service area would be without service for how long, and where. We repeatedly emphasized that the main criterion for assigning outage values was that they be realistic, neither best nor worst case, and need not reflect a mean or other point on a probability distribution. We emphasized that a single discrete outcome was required, not a branching set of contingencies. Users of the scenario would be free to alter or fill in the details to suit their needs.
To depict this outcome in a form that was useful for subsequent economic analysis, each panel filled a table in which rows represented the geographic areas affected by the earthquake, columns represented points in time, and gridcell entries contained the panelists' judgment of the damage immediately after the earthquake and subsequent degree of service restoration, e.g., fraction of power customers in a particular area whose service was available at a particular point in time. Grid entries often contained notes about the restoration activities underway and challenges facing repair crews. It was always necessary to discuss the concrete causes of the outage and the activities required to restore service, before assigning these values.
While we typically started with suggested entries for row and column headers, panelists often suggested more-meaningful alternatives that we generally adopted, as long as they appeared to cover the geographic area. Table 2 presents the layout of the table chosen by the power panel and its findings (as discussed later). Table 3 shows the panel's notes of key activities undertaken to restore power.
We did not attempt to get panelists to vote on their findings; voting would have slowed the process substantially and did not seem to offer much in the way of valuable insight. The moderator simply allowed the panelists to fill the grid organically, though in a somewhat guided fashion. That is, the moderator directed questions to quieter panelists, asking them if they agreed or had any thoughts that had not be raised already, for instance, and occasionally forcing the discussion along, e.g., "We only have so much time left and need to fill in the rest of this grid, so let's talk about the next timestep." In the last 20 minutes or so, panelists were asked to identify two or three potentially valuable opportunities for strengthening facilities or enhancing preparedness and resiliency, and to identify any research needs.
We were not slavish to the grid construct. For at least one panel (dams), the grid was not particularly meaningful, and instead we discussed the number of dams of various types damaged to varying degrees as a function of the shaking to which they were subjected (the panel preferred to think in terms of MMI). ShakeOut authors then somewhat arbitrarily selected dams to treat as damaged to varying degrees, and of course users of the scenario were free to alter the selection to suit their needs.
Where the result of consultants' computer models were offered as input to panel discussions, we instructed the panelists to consider the model results, but to modify them as they saw fit. We anticipated that some panels would find the computer model results unreasonable, extrapolating as models tend to do from smaller events, limited experimental or other empirical evidence, and the modelers' less-intimate familiarity with the assets at risk. One panel found modeled damage rates to be unrealistically high, owing in part to an extensive seismic retrofit program a relevant agency had recently completed. Another found the modeled losses for its lifeline to be "about right, if anything a little low," and did not recommend changes. None of the panels deferred to or trusted the models implicitly. They seemed to feel that mathematical models of lifeline performance are after all only models, and should be filtered through experts to account for details and extrapolation issues that are not reflected in the model. The conversations were recorded, but the recordings were never transcribed or used. Reason was, we found it sufficient to focus on filling in the grid on a whiteboard and to keep paper notes of key damage and restoration issues. At the conclusion of each panel discussion, panelists were reminded that lifelines to be discussed later might affect the one under discussion, and so they might be asked to review notes of later panels, to check that these later findings did not affect their own. As will be discussed in the Southern California Edison case study, there were some revisions to panel findings.
CASE STUDY: SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON
In the summer of 2007, a power panel was convened to evaluate the impact of the ShakeOut Scenario on the power industry and customer base in the Southern California area. The goal of the panel was to determine the time frame for power restoration for each of eight counties primarily affected by the M7.8 earthquake. The electric panel was the first to convene under the assumption that the estimated impacts to power service would be needed by all other participating sector entities.
Southern California Edison (SCE) participated in the electric panel along with various other utilities from the Southern California region. This panel made preliminary estimates regarding hypothesized power restoration timeframes based on limited information that was available at that time. Because this was the first panel to convene, there was no information regarding the impact to other critical lifelines such as water, telecommunications and natural gas as well as other dependencies which can potentially impede the electric utilities' ability to conduct damage assessment, repair equipment, and restore service.
The ShakeOut Scenario (Jones et al. 2008 ) was released in the spring of 2008 after the USGS completed all remaining panel discussions with participating groups and stakeholders. The completed open-file report contained detailed information about the impact of the earthquake on the region in addition to the extent of the impact on critical lifelines, dependencies, and controlling factors that affect SCE's ability to respond to a significant event.
When this additional, more-detailed information was made available through the report, SCE decided to re-examine and ultimately revise the original restoration time frames established during the first panel discussion. SCE was also preparing for its participation in the statewide Golden Guardian exercise and needed to assess the scenario's impact in order to provide accurate information to other exercise players. SCE had several reasons for revising the original restoration time frames produced during the first panel discussion. The main reason was that the full impact of the ShakeOut Scenario was neither apparent nor calculated during the first electric panel. SCE noted that power restoration times are strongly interdependent with other lifelines and are particularly affected by damage to the water system, natural gas delivery, transportation network, telecommunications overload, and post-earthquake fires. In revising the restoration estimates, SCE used expert judgment to consider these factors and determine the potential time frame for restoration based on damage to external dependencies. SCE also utilized the computer animation of ground shaking which revealed a long duration of strong shaking in certain sedimentary basins around the company's critical facilities. The experts also conducted their analyses of the earthquake with the recognition that the ShakeOut Scenario would have catastrophic, regional impacts.
With the entire western United States' utilities interconnected through high voltage transmission corridors, the interruption of these corridors under certain conditions can potentially impact utilities in other states. When this event is compared with the 1994 Northridge earthquake, the worst affected provider, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, could use the electric assistance of its neighbors to resume supplying power. In the circumstances presented in the ShakeOut Scenario, SCE could potentially be unable to receive assistance from neighboring utilities due to the displacement of major transmission corridors. In the ShakeOut, potentially all of the western U.S. could lose power. Outside Southern California, restoration could potentially occur within hours of the earthquake. However, in Southern California, power would have to be restored systematically, in small pockets using available resources and undamaged power equipment. Restoring power too quickly prior to properly assessing damage could result in inadvertently using compromised equipment resulting in additional power failures, equipment damage, and possibly fires.
PARTICIPATION IN THE SHAKEOUT AND GOLDEN GUARDIAN
SCE actively participated in planning meetings for the statewide professional emergency exercise Golden Guardian 2008 (GG08) at the city and county level. As part of this participation, staff from SCE's operations, communications, and emergency management groups conveyed information about the potential length of time areas may be without power following such a catastrophic earthquake. SCE was very concerned with managing the perception of what to expect immediately following the earthquake and wanted to ensure that communities and families were properly prepared to be without power for, in many cases, a significant length of time. As part of this proactive information sharing, SCE also completed the following:
• Conducted community outreach and participated in county-level Golden Guardian planning workshops with the intent to set more realistic expectations for power restoration • Communicated with drill coordinators and summarized the company's observations about lifeline interaction, and its revised assessment of power restoration time frames SCE regularly conducts annual disaster exercises, addressing a wide variety of potential disasters. In 2008, SCE participated in GG08, which used the ShakeOut Scenario as the basis for the exercise. SCE's preparation and planning for the scenario provided an opportunity to address their response to an event that was catastrophic in nature. It was also an opportunity for SCE to work in collaboration with local and state entities to determine the impact on the region and the community's response. Through its experience with GG08, SCE's emergency management team has increased the awareness of catastrophic planning at the senior management level and across all the business units within SCE. This awareness has led to increased focus and improvements in the areas of employee welfare and emergency communications.
The scenario presented a useful basis for preparedness planning: large enough to represent a severe test of SCE's system and for Southern California in general, but not a worst case. Had for example the scenario assumed Santa Ana winds were blowing at the time of the earthquake, the fire aspects of the scenario would have been much more severe, and the scenario would have lost credibility as a practical, realistic exercise. As designed, the ShakeOut is still very challenging, and is certainly far more significant than any event Southern California has experienced within the past century or more. SCE took a realistic approach when planning for the GG08 exercise, especially when determining the capabilities of its workforce following such event. The company made realistic assumptions regarding the availability of employees to begin damage assessment and repairs and the availability of SCE facilities and workplaces. To ensure substantive exercise "play", many GG08 participants assumed that Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) would be operational within 15 minutes of the earthquake. SCE assumed they would be unable to establish an EOC or convene responders for at least 48 hours. Therefore, as part of the GG08 exercise, SCE created two exercises, one termed "functional" and the other "tabletop." The tabletop exercise addressed the immediate emergency response functions following the earthquake, specifically evacuation and accounting for employees and performing triage and first aid. The functional exercise addressed the convening of EOC responders, field personnel, and conducting damage assessment. As a result of participation in GG08, SCE is focused on making improvements in the two areas it deems most critical: employee safety and welfare, and communications.
IMPACTS OF THE SHAKEOUT ON PANELISTS AND THEIR EMPLOYERS
No thorough survey has been performed of the benefits to panelists of their participation, but we know of some examples from the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP), the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD), and Caltrans (Davis 2010 , Sturdivan 2010 , and Yashinsky 2010 . Space permits citing only a subset of these:
• LADWP held a ShakeOut exercise 16-17 July 2008, whose lessons contributed to and enhanced the public ShakeOut exercise of 13 November 2008.
• The exercise led Davis to perform studies that call into question assumptions about the availability of 6 months' water supply south of the San Andreas Fault, and about how effective mutual aid would be in the event of a major Southern California earthquake. One of the studies appears in the present Earthquake Spectra special issue.
• Information provided to panelists was used in detailed studies of the seismic performance of LADWP water-distribution system under a ShakeOut event, using Cornell University's GIRAFFE simulation model. Model results suggest surprisingly high levels of potential damage, largely owing to basin effects not previously considered.
• LADWP held a series of meetings to train employees on seismic safety. In several cases, hundreds of employees attended. These meetings were "a fairly direct result" of LADWP's participation in the panels, according to Davis.
• Panel participation led to new concern about the seismic reliability of aqueducts that cross the San Andreas Fault. LADWP is evaluating and installing a highly ductile pipe within the Elizabeth Tunnel that will to allow a certain amount of water to pass through in the event of a fault rupture crossing the tunnel.
• Panel participation led to greater engagement in seismic-risk issues among LADWP's Board of Commissioners. One result is that LADWP is installing a seismic-monitoring system at the fault, in collaboration with USGS.
• MWD brought ShakeOut to the water and wastewater industry via the American Water Works Conference, California Water Wastewater Agency Response Network (CalWARN), and to a meeting of water coordinators in two counties.
• MWD led a two-day multijurisdictional emergency response exercise involving 24 agencies of the Emergency Response Network of the Inland Empire (ERNIE), a mutual-aid and emergency-response group in Riverside and San Bernardino Counties.
• MWD more closely examined interdependencies between water and agencies involved in other lifelines, especially fuel, rail, roadways, air transit, power, chemical supplies, communications, California Department of Health, and city and county EOCs.
• Concerns raised during the panel process about the fragility of telecommunications led the regional water industry to form ham radio groups, purchase satellite phones, and form groups to communicate between agencies. To further enhance communications, the industry is forming working groups and agreements with CalEMA, county operational areas, and EOCs. CalWARN is training water-agency staff to work in city and county EOCs at utilities desks throughout California. This position was activated after the 2010 Northern Baja earthquake and worked well. This real event helped the water and wastewater agencies to educate state and local officials about industry challenges in a disaster and how the industry can support affected agencies in response and recovery.
• Because of these lessons from ShakeOut, water and wastewater agencies have greatly enhanced their role in public emergency operations. MWD expects the benefits to the state and its residents to be demonstrated repeatedly in future years.
• Caltrans seemed to gain a deeper understanding of REDARS and commissioned a new study to improve the motion-damage relationships (fragility curves) for highway bridges.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Panels did not seem overly optimistic or reticent to discuss vulnerabilities. We entered the panel process aware that lifeline engineers or operators might depict an overly optimistic outcome for reasons of professional pride or public relations. While there was substantial uncertainty, and revisions were made considering lifeline interaction, the assessments seemed to be made in good faith based on the panelists' best judgment. The group discussion of lifeline interaction generally led to an increase in estimated restoration time. This is an advantage of assembling practical expert groups over just getting a single expert opinion. Panelists seemed encouraged to speak frankly by the tone set by the scientists and engineers in the initial part of the agenda. Another reason for not overestimating restoration speed was that depiction of the ShakeOut restoration could be seen as a commitment to recover as quickly as the scenario suggested in a similar, real event. For its part SCE wanted to temper public and internal expectations, which called for a more cautious depiction of restoration. 2. It was valuable to demonstrate the provenance of the inputs to panel discussions.
It turned out to be particularly helpful to have the experts who had led the seismic hazard analysis present the results. The exception proved that rule: in one panel where the earth-scientists were not on hand to present the hazard information, structural engineers challenged the estimates of seismicity and shaking intensity as unrealistic. They would have undermined the process with doubts as to its basis, and possibly refused to render judgment on the damage they were empanelled to discuss. We spent 5 minutes explaining that 100 leading USGS and SCEC earth scientists had performed multiple studies of the hazard and had reached consensus as to the shaking scenario's reasonableness. The structural engineers were reminded that they were relatively unqualified to challenge the findings of these SCEC scientists, and were asked to simply take the hazard information as a given. That worked. 3. Lifeline interaction was important. Lifeline operators tended to increase their estimates of downtime after thinking about interaction with other lifelines. Being reminded of roadway and highway damage seemed to stimulate conversation about the challenges of repair crews would face getting to damaged sites. Similarly, some utilities rely on cellphones to communicate with repair crews, and were reminded that in the first few hours after the earthquake, demand for cellphone service was likely to outstrip network capabilities, especially given earthquake-induced damage to cell towers and related equipment. 4. Moderate with flexibility but direction. During the discussion of damage and restoration, panels were given leeway to take the discussion in their preferred order and pace. They were encouraged to define the appropriate geographic scale and groupings (i.e., by county, service area, or isoseismal region), and to fill in the restoration grid in any order they preferred. They were not prevented from revisiting topics. The moderator intervened many times to elicit the thoughts of quieter panelists, to restate panelists' findings to ensure that they actually represented a consensus rather than the opinion of dominant personalities, to probe for support for questionable assertions, to keep the discussion from dwelling on minutiae, and to keep the discussion moving. Panelists were occasionally reminded of how much remained to be filled in on the restoration table and how much time remained. We recommend that the moderator in such a process be trained in facilitating group discussion.
5. Accessible geographic imagery helps. The maps and movies of fault offset and shaking were enormously popular. We did not keep records of how many downloads were made, but during the discussions panelists asked to be virtually flown around the affected area in Google Earth to focus in on particular areas. It helped to use Google Earth because one can easily navigate to particular locations by searching for them by name, and one can change the transparency of the overlain maps of shaking to see satellite images of the affected infrastructure. It also helped to compare the ShakeOut maps of shaking intensity with previous earthquakes such as 1994 Northridge or 2008 Chino Hills. It seemed to the moderator and others that some experts considered Northridge to be a true test of their preparedness and vulnerability. We helped them to calibrate their understanding of the ShakeOut by flipping back and forth between maps of these smaller events and the maps for the ShakeOut. The movies were valuable for two reasons: first, running at normal speed (i.e., 1 second of movie time for 1 second of earthquake time), they impressed panelists with the duration of strong motion. Second, the sophistication of the movies was simply exciting and engaging. We were repeatedly asked for copies, often when it was not clear that the panelist would use the movie for any other purpose than impressing colleagues. 6. Panels did help to bring science to the community, and to enhance resiliency. As the SCE case study and the LADWP and MWD experience show, involving the community in the development of the scenario made them take the process and results very seriously, think through the challenges of a major disaster, and consider how to enhance their planning and preparedness.
The panel process worked. It efficiently elicited from those most intimately familiar with the lifelines of interest the potential impacts of an earthquake on those lifelines. It seems likely that ShakeOut got more robust, credible estimates of damage and restoration by involving numerous utility operators, engineers, and planners in panels, as opposed to the strongest alternative, namely special studies by individual consultants. The panel process seemed to benefit the utilities as well: it engaged their organizations and facilitated their process of thinking through and dealing internally with their system vulnerabilities. It led to emergency response exercises the utilities might not otherwise have undertaken and to real mitigation projects and permanent changes in emergency operation procedures. It made them more aware of lifeline interaction, of the potential for damage to other lifelines to affect their own operations and restoration. It also made them more capable of communicating restoration issues and processes within their organization and to the outside world. The panel process is not appropriate for all lifelines, but for certain classes it can be extremely effective in ways that outside assessments by consultants perhaps could never be. 
